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If parks have particular characteristics, park 
managers should grant firms exclusive right to provide 
products or services within the park. The particular 
characteristics include that park development is only 
attractive to foreign visitors, that foreign visitors are 
only valuable for the currency they spend, and that 
development and congestion reduce the park's value to 
domestic visitors. 
Permitting monopoly to provide development means 
maximizing net revenue from sale of services to foreigners. 
Monopoly concessions also mean less development is produced 
than with competing concessions. Less development and fewer 
foreign visitors mean increased value to domestic visitors. 
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National parks stand as the supreme acknowledgement of 
the importance of a country's natural heritage. Decisions 
about national parks are never a product of complete 
consensus, of course. Even individuals who support creation 
of a park often disagree about policies administrators 
should adopt to maximize a park's value to society. 
Providing one source of disagreement is the decision 
about the extent to which a park's natural features should 
be sacrificed to development. In part parks are established 
to preserve natural features, but those natural features 
must be altered to allow access and to enhance the 
experience of park visitors. The competing objectives of 
preservation and development are recognized even in the 
legal acts establishing parks. The National Parks Act, 
which created the u.s. National Park Service, tacitly 
acknowledges the twin requirements of preservation and 
development: 
The service thus established shall promote and 
regulate the use of •.• national parks ..• to conserve 
the scenery and the natural and historic objects and 
the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment 




Nor is the United States unique in its recognition of 
the conflict between use and preservation. New Zealand's 
National Parks Act is an example where these goals are even 
-more clearly stated: 
They shall be preserved as far as possible in their 
natural state ..• (but) development and operation of 
recreational and public amenities and related services 
appropriate for the public use and enjoyment of the 
park may be authorized. 2 
Further complicating but related to the decision about 
the extent of development is the necessity to choose the 
method of providing development in the park. In particular, 
park authorities must decide whether to use public resources 
or allow private firms to provide products and services to 
park visitors. 
For some parks, the difficulty in determining the 
quantity and appropriate method of providing development is 
compounded because developed facilities are attractive 
mainly to visitors from other countries. For these parks, 
development enhances the value of the park to foreign 
visitors but reduces the value of the park to those domestic 
visitors who prefer unaltered natural features. This 
situation also occurs in state parks with facilities used by 
non-residents, facilities built at the expense of natural 
areas preferred by local residents. 
Examples of parks whose developed facilities are 
attractive particularly to foreign visitors include some 
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(particularly western) Canadian parks, parks in several 
African countries, and parks in New Zealand. In New Zealand 
for example, seventy to eighty percent of park hotel and 
park airport users are foreigners. 3 
New Zealand is used here and elsewhere as an example 
because its park characteristics so closely match those of 
the model and because its park system is so extensive and 
important. Six percent of New Zealand's land area is 
preserved in national parks compared to less than one 
percent in the United States. 4 
The purpose of this paper is to predict the effect on 
park development of the type of private concession granted, 
particularly whether a firm is granted an exclusive 
concession or whether competing firms are allowed to offer 
the product or service. That is, the paper compares park 
development resulting from monopoly concessions to 
development resulting from competitive concessions and 
evaluates the two policies in parks where development is 
valuable mainly to foreign visitors. 
The next section of this paper defines development as 
alterations to the park which attract foreign visitors. The 
adverse effect of development and congestion on domestic 
visitors is considered in the third section. Sections four 
and five develop the main model and its implications, 
concluding that monopoly concessions maximize profit from 
sale of developed services to foreigners and that monopoly 
development means less development is produced than with 
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competing concessions. Reduced development and fewer 
foreign visitors resulting from monopoly concessions imply 
increased value to domestic visitors. 
Subsequent sections address potential complications. 
The effect of price discrimination on profit and output is 
considered. The dubio~s value of price controls on monopoly 
concessions is presented. Advantages and disadvantages of 
integrating several products under one concession are 
discussed. 
2. Development 
Park development is defined in this paper as changes 
in the natural area that appeal to foreign visitors. To 
yield interesting results, development in a ~ark must also 
have negative value to domestic visitors. That some 
alterations in a park are desired by domestic visitors is 
indisputable. Of concern here, however, are alterations in 
excess of those desired by domestic visitors. 
Development has two dimensions. The first is the pure 
quantity or capacity dimension. The number of restaurant 
tables is a measure of capacity. An increase in capacity 
-
means an increase in the number of foreign visitors. Notice 
the assumption that the actual number of foreign visitors 
and the capacity for foreign visitors is the same. The 
model assumes all "potential" capacity is occupied. An 
equivalent assumption is to treat unoccupied facilities as 
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additional development intensity, valuable to foreigners. 
Naturally, additional capacity is costly to produce. 
The second dimension of development is its quality or 
intensity. An increase in this dimension of development 
does not increase the capacity of the park, but does make 
the park more attractive to foreign visitors. Improvements 
in hotel rooms in a park is an example of an increase in 
intensity of development. The number of rooms, and thus 
capacity of the park, has not changed, but the value of a 
room to a foreign visitor has increased. Other examples 
include facilities like swimming pools and tennis courts 
provided for hotel guests. These facilities are often the 
most controversial changes in a park since they most 
dramatically violate the popular idea that only forms of 
recreation "appropriate" to the natural park setting should 
be permitted (Sax 1980). 
Development capacity (x) is the characteristic 
explicitly priced by producers. The second characteristic, 
development intensity (Z), is some other desired aspect of 
development. 5 Producers combine the two characteristics 
when selling the product. The marginal value or price of X 
is a decreasing function of capacity X and an increasing 
function of intensity Z: 
(1 ) Price' = P(X,Z} P <0, P >0, P <0 x z zz 
(Subscripts indicate partial derivatives.) 
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Firms maximize revenue less production cost from sale 
of development. Production cost is assumed a function of 
the two characteristics: 
(2) Total Cost = C(X,Z) cx' C > 0z 
Any decision about development by private firms or by 
park managers must count this cost against the benefit of 
development. Direct cost, however, is only one of the 
sacrifices required to provide park development. 
3. Domestic Visitors, Development, and Congestion 
An individual living in the country visits a park if 
the value (reservation price) of the visit exceeds its cost, 
primarily travel cost. Domestic market demand for the park 
is the appropriate sum of ~ndividual reservation prices. 
Without other restrictions, the number of domestic visitors 
increases until value to the last visitor is equal to travel 
cost. 
Let the net value of the park to domestic visitor i be 
given by the following: 
( 3 ) Net value = V1(Z,G)-T v , V <0 z g 
Where: V = the reservation price of domestic visitor i 
and reservation prices are arranged in 
order of decreasing reservation price, 
G = the number of foreign visitors (X) plus the 
number of domestic visitors (N), G=N+X, and 
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T =	 travel cost, assumed identical for all domestic 
visitors.' 
Domestic visitors continue to enter the park until the 
cost of travel is just equal to the reservation price for 
the last (Nth) visitor. 
(4)	 ~(Z,G) = T 
Total value of the park to domestic visitors is the 
sum of reservation prices less travel cost to those who 
visit the park. 





An important element of recreation within parks is 
congestion. Largely because entry is not restricted, people 
tend to continue arriving at parks to the point where 
congestion becomes a consideration. Even with restricted 
entry or admission fees, congestion may be a factor. Thus, 
the value function of each potential park visitor includes 
congestion as an independent variable. An increase in 
congestion--an increase in the number of other visitors-­
reduces the park's value to each individual (Vg<O).' In 
the simple case, it does not matter whether the other 
visitors are foreigners since anyone's presence causes 
undesired congestion (G=N+X). 
A more complicated assumption allows an individual to 
have a different attitude toward congestion caused by 
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foreign visitors than congestion caused by domestic visitors 
[G=N+Q(X)]. In this case, one additional foreign visitor 
may reduce the number of domestic visitors by more than one 
(Qx>l) or, more likely, less than one (Qx<l). If fore~gn 
tourists concentrate in developed areas of the park, they 
may have limited effect on domestic visitors. 
Foreign visitors may also be adversely affected by 
congestion. However, the paper does not explicitly treat 
congestion's influence on foreign demand, avoiding the 
(unlikely) question of whether entry by domestic visitors 
should be restricted in order to increase revenue from 
foreign visitors. In most countries, restricting entry by 
domestic visitors is politically impossible. In many cases 
it is easy to believe that foreign visitors are willing to 
accept more congestion than domestic visitors. If so, 
ignoring congestion effects on foreigners does little 
violence to reality. 
The equilibrium condition in equation (5) defines the 
number of visitors N as an implicit function of T, G, and Z 
[N*=N(T,G,Z)]. Derivatives of the equilibrium condition 
yield the comparative statics sought here. What is the 
effect on domestic visitors of an increase in the number 
foreign visitors? Take the derivative of the equilibrium 
condition (4) with respect to X where G=X+N. 
( 6) N V +V = 0 x g g 
(7 ) N =-1 x 
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An additional foreign visitor means one domestic 
visitor chooses not to visit. Referring to equation (5), 
the reduced number of domestic visitors coupled with the 
lower value to the remaining domestic visitors means an 
increase in the number of foreign visitors reduces the net 
value of the park to domestic visitors. 
Increases in development intensity also make the net 
value of the park to domestic visitors fall. Take the 
derivative of equation (4) with respect to X. 
(8 ) v +V N = 0z g z 
( 9) N = -v IV < 0z z g 
Additional development reduces the number of domestic 
visitors. Again referring to equation (5), fewer domestic 
visitors and lower value to the remaining visitors means 
increases in development reduce the value of the park to 
domestic visitors. 
In summary, park development affects domestic visitors 
in two ways. Because it attracts foreign visitors, 
development reduces the park's value to domestic visitors, 
since additional foreign visitors mean additional 
congestion, fewer domestic visitors, and lower value to 
domestic visitors. The park's value to domestic visitors is 
also influenced by the intensity of development since 
development alters attractive natural features. 
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4. Comparing Monopoly and Competition 
Faced with the legal mandate to control development, 
park authorities can choose to provide development using 
government resources or can grant permission for private 
firms to provide facilities within parks. ~his latter and 
more common case is is considered here. 
Park managers place a variety of restrictions on 
concessions and use a variety of techniques to grant 
concessions within parks. At the most fundamental level, 
however, park managers decide whether to grant exclusive 
right to provide a product or service or to grant some non­
exclusive right. That is, park managers choose to create a 
monopoly or to permit competing firms to provide 
development. Because of their aversion to unrestricted 
development, managers usually limit the number of competing 
concessions, if competing concession are permitted at all. 
These limited concessions are defined as competing 
concessions in this paper. 
If the number of concessions granted to provide a 
given service is greater than one but less than would occur 
with no restriction on entry, firms respond in one of 
several ways. One possibility is that firms tacitly or 
openly collude and so act like a monopoly. Firms may also 
act in a manner consistent with some model of cooperative 
12
 
oligopoly. The first result, being identical to monopoly, 
is considered in the monopoly section of the paper. 
The second possibility implies some result between 
competition and monopoly so long as cooperation is imperfect 
and given the temptation to cheat on any cooperative 
agreement. If choices by firms in a cooperative oligopoly 
yield greater development and lower profit than monopoly, 
the policy advantages of monopoly remain and the discussion 
of competitive concessions below apply as well to 
cooperative oligopoly. 
The third possibility, of interest to this section, is 
that firms compete. The general result of-this competition 
is consistent whether the model is of competitive firms 
where entry is restricted or is unrestricted, for models of 
non-cooperative oligopoly, Cournot-Nash equilibria being an 
example, or for models of monopolistic competition where 
each firm produces a slightly different product. 
Firms compete by increasing development capacity and 
intensity.· The pressure on competing firms increase 
development is a result of the fact that a competing firm's 
decisions have an external effect on other firms. When it 
increases capacity, a competing firm does not fully 
recognize that such a decision reduce prices received by 
other firms. The firm also does not fully recognize that 
increases in its intensity reduce demand for development 




Assume a competing firm maximizes profit, faces a 
downward sloping demand curve, and ignores its effect on 
other firms: 1o 
(10) maximize S = XP(X,Z) - C(X,z) w.r.t. X,Z 
First order conditions for maximization are the 
following: 
(11) S = XP + P - C = 0x x x 
(12) S = XP - C = 0 z z z 
By contrast, a monopoly recognizes the effect of its 
capacity and intensity decisions, since all consumers are 
customers of the monopoly. The monopoly only cares about 
increases in capacity that increase profit given the lower 
price. The monopoly only cares about increases in intensity 
of development as they increase total willingness to pay for 
development by foreigners. Because it recognizes that 
effects external to competing firms are internal to the 
monopoly, the monopoly produces less development than 
competing firms. 
For simplicity, let the monopoly control a number of 
park facilities, each equivalent to a firm under 
competition. As under competition, the facilities need not 
produce identical X and Z. Using a mUlti-facility monopoly 
makes comparing monopoly and competition relatively easy 
without restricting behavior of the monopoly since a multi ­
facility monopoly may choose a different number of 
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facilities than under competition by setting output of some 
facilities to zero. 
A monopoly producer of park development maximizes 
profit with respect to X and Z for each of n facilities 
given a downward-sloping demand for outputs of the 
individual facilities. Demand curves for the facilities 
have the same relationship between one another as for firms 
under competition. 




Zk) - Cj(Xj,zj) 
for all j~k 
j = l ••• n, k = l ••• n 
The first order conditions for each facility are the 
following (omitting superscript j): 
all k~j 
The respective first order conditions for competition 
and monopoly show the marginal cost of X is lower for the 
competing firm. Rewriting conditions (11) and (14) yields 
the following: 
(18) xPx + P 
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For (18) and (19) the right-hand terms are marginal 
cost of capacity. Starting at the monopoly output, marginal 
cost is the same under monopoly and competition. The left ­
hand terms are marginal revenue. The monopoly (19) has as a 
component of marginal revenue a negative term reflecting the 
effect an increase in this facility's capacity has on the 
revenue of other facilities. Thus, starting from the 
monopoly optimum, the competing firm has larger marginal 
revenue for X but the same marginal cost as the monopoly. 
Competing firms admit more foreigners than monopoly. This 
is the usual result. 
Equations (20) and (21) manipulate the first order 
conditions for choice of Z under competition and monopoly 
and omit j superscripts. 
= Cz 
(21) all k~j 
As before, in (20) and (21) the right-hand terms are 
marginal cost, this time of development intensity. Starting 
at the monopoly output, marginal cost is the same under 
monopoly and competition. The left-hand terms are marginal 
revenue. The monopoly includes a negative term showing the 
effect an increase in this facility's intensity has on 
revenue of other facilities. Once again, the competing firm 
has larger marginal revenue for Z but the same marginal cost 
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as the monopoly. Competing firms produce more intensely 
developed facilities than a monopoly chooses. ll 
If a competing firm chooses X holding Z constant or Z 
holding X constant, the model's predictions are unambiguous. 
A global maximum for the competing firm likely occurs in the 
direction of higher Z and X, although nothing in the model 
guarantees this result. A sufficient condition to increase 
both is that a tangent plane exists for competing firms at 
the monopoly maximum. 
Given that the monopoly has chosen global maximum, 
increasing both X and Z reduces profit. If the competing 
firm increases X and Z by some amount, the cost increase is 
identical to the monopoly, but the competing firm earns more 
revenue. Once again, the competing firm does not face the 
opportunity cost of lost earnings to other facilities. An 
increase in both X and Z increases a competing firm's 
profit. 
The global maximum for the competing firm may be 
located at some other combination, however. l2 The firm 
would never reduce both X and Z, using symmetric reasoning 
why it gains by increasing both X and Z. What about the 
other two possibilities? 
Consider the possibility that competing firms choose 
more capacity (X) but lower intensity (2) than a monopoly. 
For simplicity, assume. production cost is the same at the 
monopoly maximum and the competing maximum. The competing 
firm choice must increase revenue where a similar choice 
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would reduce monopoly revenue. This occurs when loss of 
revenue by other monopoly facilities (negative external 
effect) is larger than the positive own effect on revenue. 
Other facility demand curves must shift more because of a 
change in own price than because of a change in own 
intensity. X is less important or more substitutable to 
consumers between facilities than Z. 
Likewise, for a competing firm's revenue to increase, 
demand must be elastic enough so that the increase in 
revenue due to the increase in X offsets the demand shift 
due to lower Z. Once again, consumers respond more to a 
change in price per unit of capacity than for a change in 
intensity. Although no compelling reason argues for 
functions of this form in the case of park development, 
opponents of unrestricted concessions often argue competing 
concessions produce an excessive quantity of cheap and low 
quality facilities (Ise 1961). 
The other possible response by competing firms seems 
more plausible in the case of foreign visitor demand 
functions, but intuitively less plausible. Symmetric 
reasoning from the previous situation suggests a decrease in 
X and and increase in Z under competition is more likely if 
foreigners are more sensitive to changes in intensity 
(quality) than to changes in price. This is a reasonable 
assertion if foreigners spend a substantial sum just to get 
to the park or if they tend to be wealthy. However, this 
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result jars economic intuition since it envisions competing 
firms rushing to raise price and reduce quantity. 
The simple result that competing firms increase both 
capacity and intensity remains the most compelling. The 
possibility of another result cannot be" rejected, but 
predict"ing such a result requires additional information 
about actual functional forms. 
5. Monopoly is Superior 
A park manager's objective is to allow that capacity 
and intensity of development which maximizes the park's net 
social value. For the usual applications of welfare 
economics, net social value is defined as the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, the area under the 
appropriate demand curve less opportunity cost of 
production. By this definition, monopoly is considered 
inferior to perfect competition since the monopoly produces 
an output at which some consumer and producer surplus is 
lost. 
The manager of the sort of park considered in this 
model seeks to maximize the park's social value to the 
nation's citizens. As such, a manager is interested in 
foreign visitors only insofar as they spend valuable foreign 
currency within the country and to the extent that their 
presence makes domestic visitors worse off. Development, 
which attracts foreign visitors, is valuable only as it 
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earns foreign currency and costly as it discourages domestic 
visitors and consumes the country's valuable resources. 
Apparently contradicting traditional theory, this 
paper concludes monopoly concessions are superior to 
competing concessions. Not surprisingly, the contradiction 
is only apparent. Given its assumptions, this paper's 
conclusion is consistent with traditional theory. Monopoly 
concessions are superior to competing concessions because 
monopoly concessions result in more profit from foreign 
tourists and greater value to domestic visitors. 
Foreign visitors to a park are only valuable as they 
spend foreign currency in excess of cost. A monopoly 
selling developed facilities to foreigners maximizes foreign 
currency revenue less operating cost. Competing concessions 
earn less economic profit than a monopoly, perhaps zero 
economic profit. Since foreigners are only valuable for 
their currency, the usual normative judgments against 
monopoly do not apply. The deadweight loss of consumer 
surplus due to monopoly pricing is not important since 
foreign consumer surplus is not important. The usually 
unimportant (or undesirable) transfer of consumer surplus to 
monopoly not only is important, but is a desirable transfer 
from foreigners to a domestic firm. 
The profit in foreign currency earned by a monopoly is 
the first of two reasons monopoly concessions are superior 
to competing concessions. A monopoly concession is also 




a park's natural features, any reduction in development 
makes domestic visitors better off. As previously shown, a 
monopoly concession produces a lower capacity and intensity 
than competing concessions. In addition, the number of 
domestic visitors is greater than under monopoly. 
The conclusion that monopoly is a superior producer of 
park development is a result of the assumptions of the 
model. The conclusions may change if these assumptions are 
altered. Subsequent sections of this paper consider the 
effect of adding some complexity to the assumptions. 
6. Price Discrimination 
The simple theory of monopoly assumes only one price 
is charged. The theory's conclusions change when the 
monopoly is permitted to price discriminate, defined as 
charging different prices to different consumers, prices 
based on willingness to pay. 
A monopoly which price discriminates earns more profit 
than the simple monopoly, profit from two sources. For one, 
consumers who purchased the product from the simple monopoly 
now pay a higher price, at the extreme, a price equal to 
maximum willingness to pay. Second, the price 
discriminating monopoly sells its product to consumers who 
did not purchase from the simple monopoly. A price 
discriminating monopoly sells its product as long as the 
price it can charge a cons'umer or group of consumers is 
higher than cost of production. A perfectly price 
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discriminating monopoly produces the same output as under 
perfect competition, and earns as additional profit the 
entire consumer surplus present under perfect competition. 
To a park manager, the additional profit earned by a 
discriminating monopoly makes it more attractive than the 
simple monopoly. Additional profit is earned from foreign 
tourists whose currency is valuable. To the extent that a 
price discriminating monopoly increases output, the 
superiority of monopoly over competition in supplying 
development is not assured, however. Since a price 
discriminating monopoly increases development, domestic 
visitors are worse off. 
Either of the monopoly situations is superior to 
competition since each either implies more profit from 
foreigners and, at worst, no more development than under 
competition. However, it is possible to determine which of 
the monopoly situations is preferred only by measuring 
demand curves and assigning relative weights to foreign 
currency and domestic consumer value. 
7. Price Controls 
One popular policy chosen by park authorities who 
grant monopoly concessions is to impose a price ceiling. 13 
This common price control is also a clearly incorrect 
choice. In the usual case, a price ceiling is used to force 
a monopoly to increase output and to reduce profit earned by 
the monopoly. Obviously, these two effects are exactly the 
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opposite of the desired result for the manager of the sort 
of park considered in this model. The price control reduces 
the valuable currency earned from foreign tourists and 
increases park development. 
The conclusion that a price ceiling increases 
development is unambiguous so long as development has only 
one dimension. Since price controls are typically defined 
only on quantity (capacity), a monopoly tends to evade the 
restriction by manipulating the uncontrolled dimension. To 
the extent that development intensity is substitutable for 
capacity, the price control's effectiveness is reduced. 14 
Such a possibility leaves this paper's conclusions 
materially unaffected, however. Either the price control is 
effective and so undesirable, or the price control is 
ineffective and so useless. Both cases argue against 
imposing the restriction. 
How would a monopoly producer of park development 
evade a price ceiling? Figure One illustrates the monopoly 
response. 
An uncontrolled monopoly chooses X and Z (for facility 
i) to maximize profit (R*, X*, Z*). Other choices of X and 
Z imply lower profit and represented by iso-profit contours 
Rl >R2 . For a given controlled price, the monopoly can 
choose a variety of combinations of X and Z, represented by 
the price locus PP. A lower price control moves PP to the 
right, and a higher (less restrictive) price control moves 
PP to the left. The monopoly picks the combination of X and 
23 
Z along PP tangent to the highest profit contour (X2 , Z2). 
Given well-behaved functions, the constrained monopoly 










Monopoly Response to Price Ceiling, Ordinary Case 
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The monopoly might also reduce both X and Z or 
increase both. The latter is the more likely of these two 
non-standard cases. It is reasonable to assert that as Z 
increases, tourists become less responsive to changes in 
price and so more responsive to changes in X. This is 
similar to asserting that high quality items have less 
elastic demand curves than low quality items. Such an 
assumption means the iso-price loci .become steeper as Z 
increases. As Figure Two shows, the steep and increasing 
slope of PP makes it more likely that the monopoly responds 
to the price ceiling by increasing both X and.Z (X3 ' Z3). 
In. addition, the iso-profit contour map is likely not 
strictly circular. To the extent that contours are 
ellipsoidal with major axes tilted toward the origin, 
monopoly is more likely to increase both X and Z. Refer 
again to Figure Two. Strong complementarity in cost of X 










Monopoly Response to Price Ceiling, X and Z Increase 
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As worst, price controls on a monopoly concession 
increase (undesired) development and reduce foreign currency 
earnings. At best, the monopoly (or for that matter 
competing firm) response is unpredictable without 
considerable detailed information about monopoly cost, 
production, and revenue and without data comparing domestic 
visitor attitude toward development capacity and intensity. 
Price controls are a poor policy choice. 
a.Non-Competing Services 
The park manager is faced with more than adopting a 
policy toward competing concessions. Some concessions 
provide services which do not compete but are complementary, 
a park restaurant and housing being an example. The park 
manager may choose to allow separate firms to provide such 
services or permit a kind of conglomerate merger by allowing 
one firm to offer several of these services. 
Two related effects of this integration are relevant 
in the case of park development aimed at foreign tourists. 
First, such integration overcomes some of the public goods 
aspects of advertising. Second, integration can assure 
consumers uniform quality given limited information. The 
various managerial and pecuniary economies of conglomerate 
merger are not considered here in favor of addressing 
aspects unique to this particular type of national park. 
28 
Advertising provides potential foreign visitors 
valuable information about characteristics of the advertised 
product. Much of what makes park facilities appealing is 
the attractive features of the park itself. If one firm" 
advertises the attractions of a park in conjunction with 
facility advertising, other firms in the park benefit. 
Visitors attracted to the park because of the advertising 
use some unadvertised facilities. Because of this public 
goods characteristic of advertising, each firm ignores the 
benefit to other firms of its advertising and exploits the 
advertising of other firms. A single integrated firm 
overcomes the public goods problem since advertising only 
benefits that firm. The integrated firm produces that 
quantity of advertising which maximizes the value of all 
advertising less cost. 
Similar reasoning suggests an integrated firm can 
assure uniform quality from the various components of a 
developed area. The cost to a foreign visitor of learning 
about the quality of each service in an area may be 
substantial. The knowledge that all services in a park are 
provided by one organization assures the visitor uniform 
quality from a variety of services. 
Of course, sufficient advertising may be provided 
without vertical integration. Local tourist associations, 
local government agencies, or national tourist agencies 
provide group advertising funded through various 
contribution schemes or taxes. In this case, integration 
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affords no advantage. Valuable quality information may be 
provided without integration also. Tour books, quality 
ratings, and trade associations can provide information 
about quality. Here firms producing development can jointly 
produce information or independent organizations can gain by 
selling information. 
9. Conclusion 
If parks have particular characteristics, park 
managers should grant firms exclusive right to provide 
products or services within the park. Thus, contrary to the 
usual case, the manager is wise to allow monopoly provision 
of park development. The particular characteristics include 
that park development is only attractive to foreign 
visitors, that foreign visitors are only valuable for the 
currency they spend, and that development and congestion 
reduce the park's value to domestic visitors. 
A park manager seeks to maximize the sum of foreign 
currency earnings less production cost of development and 
consumer surplus of domestic visitors less travel cost. 
Permitting monopoly to provide development means maximizing 
net revenue from sale of services to foreigners. Monopoly 
concessions also mean less development is produced than 
under competing concessions. Less development and fewer 
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